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Abstract: The current paper analyses the competition degree among Romanian banks during 2005-
2015. We determine the bank-level competition for loans and deposits using efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index, while Boone indicator shows how competitive these two markets are. Marginal costs (MC) are 
estimated with a Fourier flexible form cost function with two bank products, that generate the largest 
portion of revenues, (i.e. loans and deposits) and three input prices (i.e. labour, funds and physical 
capital). We use DFA for efficiency-improved Lerner index and Generalized Method of Moments with 
one-, two- or three-year lagged values of marginal costs as instrumental variables for Boone indicator. 
The results are compared to the values of HHI and C5, provided by European Central Bank. Overall, 
bank competition in Romania improves as a direct result of decreasing market power and concentration. 
On the loan market, we can notice that starting with 2014 banks have changed their behaviour by 
focusing more on optimizing their portfolios through a complex process of balance sheet cleaning, 
instead of acquiring additional market share and be more competitive. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last years, Romanian banking market has continuously changed. The 
most recent financial crisis has brought about difficult challenges but Romanian 
banks have been able to overcome them, as they have been well capitalized and 
solvable.  Lately there is a slight decline in the number of credit institutions mainly 
due to mergers, along with a focus on selling of the non-performing loans portfolios 
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and restructuring the financial institutions by closing several branches and lowering 
the total costs. 
This topic is relevant for both researchers and practitioners. The banking system 
represents one of the most important sectors for the Romanian economy since it 
provides 90% of the funding and herewith it determines the overall competitiveness, 
economic growth and prosperity. Romanian banking market has been subject to 
structural adjustments due to changes in external environment, caused mainly by 
financial crisis, regulatory framework and new ample projects. From 2008 to 2013, 
the personnel costs have dropped by 13%, one of the highest cost cutting rates from 
the region, along with a decline in the number of employees and bank outlets. 
Moreover, the implementation of European directives and regulations on lending, 
payments, saving and dispute resolution has caused greater expenses and stimulated 
credit institutions to consolidate their activities. 
Competition plays an essential role in the Romanian economy since it fosters 
efficiency through better allocation of resources, improves the quality of goods and 
services, stimulates innovations and boosts international competitiveness. In the 
banking sector, higher efficiency translates into lower costs that are passed onto bank 
customers, in the form of lower charges, higher deposit rates and reduced lending 
costs.  
From a policy point of view, it is difficult to know what impact these structural 
developments are likely to have on the competitive environment and how they may 
influence the efficiency and stability of banking markets. On the one hand, increased 
concentration is expected to intensify market power and therefore hinder both 
competition and efficiency. Hence, it might be argued that if bank mergers and 
acquisitions are driven by economies of scale, then increased concentration may 
foster efficiency improvements. 
This paper marks its contribution to the literature in three ways. First, competition is 
measured at bank-level for each of the two markets: loans and deposits. The extant 
researches assess the overall Romanian banking competition. Our approach provides 
more accurate results in terms of costs and profits, and better competition measures 
since we take into account the competition faced by each bank and admit that even 
if the credit institutions operate in the same market, they deal with various 
competitiveness degrees. The average measures of competition for a certain market 
delivers incomplete information about the competitive position of each individual 
bank.  
Moreover, adjusted Lerner index and Boone indicator represent the most recent 
indices on the market power of financial entities from Romania and they offer 
different perspectives on the degree of competition in the markets and for the banks 
under observation. 
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Finally, the extended timeframe provides valuable outcomes on the impact of 
European Union accession, financial crisis and new banking regulations. These three 
representative events have not been in-depth analysed yet, even if they have 
influenced the behaviour of the banks. 
The paper is structured in several parts. Section 2 reviews the extant literature on the 
measures used to account for bank competition. The next section presents the data 
and the methodology followed. Afterwards, the main results and several conclusions 
come. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Bank competition has gained increasing interest in the last years due to the role it 
plays in the economy through the access to finance and capital allocation and its 
impact on overall financial stability and development. Academics, practitioners and 
regulatory authorities have constantly aimed at developing the most accurate 
measure of competition, determining the optimal level of market competitiveness 
and implementing the appropriate regulations to maintain it. 
Nevertheless, assessing the competition degree is not an easy task, since one cannot 
measure it directly. Therefore, in the extant literature, the researchers make use of 
either structural (Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (SCP) and efficiency 
theory) or non-structural approaches (New Empirical Industrial Organization 
(NEIO). Both categories of models help at analysing whether a more concentrated 
market translates into collusive conduct of the major banks and better performance 
or only the efficiency of the larger banks causes superior financial results.  
The structural approaches make a connection between competition and 
concentration, whereas their counterparties do not take into account concentration 
and aim at correcting the empirical and theoretical drawbacks of SCP and efficiency 
theory. The structural measures belong to two schools of thought: formal (number 
of firms, concentration ratios and Herfindahl-Hirschman index) and non-formal 
(SCP and efficiency theory). The number of companies on the market is the simplest 
competition indicator to compute since the data needed are easily available. Though, 
this measure does not take into account the distribution of the firms and is 
consequently less used. A better index that requires additional input on the market 
shares of the business units is concentration ratio (CR) that is more frequently 
calculated in the researches. The major flaw of CR is the focus on several companies 
(three, five or ten) and does not consider the distribution of the remaining market 
players. Researchers and regulatory agents prefer Herfindahl-Hirschman indicator 
(Hirschman (1964)) that equals to the sum of the squares of the market shares of the 
total number of companies (N). According to U.S. Antitrust Agencies Issue New 
Merger Guidelines of 2010, banking industry is competitive when HHI is below 
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1,500, concentrated if it ranges between 1,500 and 2,500, and very concentrated 
when the value of Herfindahl-Hirschman indicator goes above 2,500. In the 
computation of this index, larger companies receive a higher weight than the smaller 
firms, highlighting their importance. Mason (1939) and Bain (1957) develop the SCP 
theory and state that the structure of the industries and markets where companies 
operate determine the firm conduct and performance. The number of business 
entities, their absolute and relative size, entry and exit conditions, product 
differentiation and vertical integration describe the structure of a market or industry. 
The business conduct refers to price setting, collusion and other types of strategic 
behaviour such as product quality, expenditure on advertising, research, 
development and innovation. The performance of a company is a function of profit, 
annual growth, market share, technological progress and efficiency. The main take-
aways from this theory are that the probability of collusion is a positively impacted 
by the market power and a more concentrated industry encourages firms to behave 
uncompetitively. Gilbert (1984), Reid (1987), Vesala (1995) and Bos (2002) note 
that all the researches based on SCP paradigm do not take into account the conduct 
of the bank. 
The efficiency theory proposed by Demsetz (1973) and Peltzmann (1977) challenges 
the rationale behind the SCP paradigm by stating that once a bank is the most 
efficient its profit maximizing behaviour facilitates the increase in the market share 
by cutting down the costs. Banks’ performance shapes the market share and 
concentration is the output of the leading banks. 
The Lerner index is still currently the most widely and frequently used and it is 
known as a measure of market power and the intensity of competition. As a matter 
of fact, Lerner (1934) describes his indicator as “index of the degree of monopoly 
power” and defines it mathematically as  
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖 =
𝑃𝑖−𝑚𝑐𝑖
𝑃𝑖
                                                                                                                          (1) 
where 𝑃𝑖  represents firm i’s price whereas 𝑚𝑐𝑖 refers to marginal cost. The values 
of the index range between zero and one, with zero reflecting perfect competition 
and increasing values showing a higher market power. The spread usage of Lerner 
index stems from fewer data constraints, easy interpretation and simplicity. 
Basically, Lerner indicator shows the extent to which a bank can charge prices higher 
than the marginal cost. Consequently, there are only two data requirements.  
Koetter et al., (2012) propose a new measure for market power, based on the fact 
that Lerner index makes two major assumptions. The former is the companies choose 
the prices that maximize the profits (profit efficiency). The latter refers to obtaining 
the inputs at the most appropriate cost (cost efficiency). Thus, the estimated price-
cost margins do not accurately reflect the real market power of the business entities. 
As a matter of fact, Lerner (1934) focuses on actual or exercised market power, 
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whereas Koetter et al., (2012) are concerned only with potential market power. 
Therefore, Lerner index is altered for efficiency and becomes adjusted Lerner index. 
The mathematical equation is  
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖 =
𝜋𝑖+𝑡𝑐𝑖−𝑚𝑐𝑖 ∙𝑞𝑖
𝜋𝑖+𝑡𝑐𝑖
                                                                     (2) 
with the bank profit being 𝜋𝑖, total cost  𝑡𝑐𝑖, marginal cost 𝑚𝑐𝑖 and total output 𝑞𝑖. 
The adjusted Lerner index can take values between 0 and 1, higher results reflecting 
stronger market power. 
Boone indicator is a new approach to measure competition used by van Leuvensteijn 
et al. (2007) for the first time in an empirical study. The index replaces relative profit 
differences, a theoretical construct difficult to be implemented in practice and 
proposed by Boone (2008). As a matter of fact, Boone, Griffith and Harrison (2005) 
recommend profit elasticity (PE) or Boone indicator as empirical analogue of relative 
profit differences (RPD). Boone indicator expresses the elasticity of profits to 
marginal costs  
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 =
𝜕 ln𝜋𝑖
𝜕 ln𝑚𝑐𝑖
                                                                                (3) 
where 𝜋𝑖 shows the firm i’s total profits and 𝑚𝑐𝑖 equals the marginal costs. Profit 
elasticity is expected to take negative values due to the inverse relationship between 
profits and marginal costs. 
The current studies have investigated the overall Romanian banking competitiveness 
using Lerner-index (Andrieṣ and Cãpraru, 2011; Cãpraru and Andrieṣ, 2012; 
Coccorese, 2014; Lapteacru, 2014; Clerides et al., 2015) HHI (Andrieṣ and Cãpraru, 
2011; Lapteacru, 2014); C5 (Andrieṣ and Cãpraru, 2011); H-statistic (Bikker and 
Spierdijk, 2008; Andrieṣ and Cãpraru, 2011; Cãpraru and Andrieṣ, 2012; Lapteacru, 
2014), adjusted-Lerner index (Clerides et al., 2015) and Boone indicator (Clerides et 
al., 2015). 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
The timeframe under analysis is 2005-2015. The sample consists in Romanian 
commercial banks. The database that provides the input for the computation of 
competition measures is Bankscope/ Orbis Bank Focus. 
Marginal costs (MC) are estimated with a Fourier flexible form cost function with 
two bank products, that generate the largest portion of revenues, (i.e. loans and 
deposits) and three input prices (i.e. labour, funds and physical capital). We use DFA 
for efficiency-improved Lerner index and Generalized Method of Moments with 
one-, two- or three-year lagged values of marginal costs as instrumental variables for 
Boone indicator. The price of labour is equal to the ratio between the personnel 
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expenditures and total assets of the banks, since the number of employees and 
branches is most of the time unavailable. The division of the costs represents the 
price of physical capital with premises by the value of fixed assets. The ratio between 
the interest rate on deposits and total deposits represents the cost of deposits. 
The values for HHI and C5 are taken from the ECB. 
 
4. Results and Discussions 
A structural analysis of market competition for the period 2005 – 2015 highlights a 
decline in concentration for the Romanian banking sector in the case of both 
Herfindhal-Hirschman index (HHI) and the concentration of the first five banks 
(CR5). These results are depicted by the first two figures from the appendix. 
Therefore, we can state that from a structural point of view, competition is fiercer 
since starting with 2008 HHI lowers and remains constantly around the value 1,000, 
proving a high competition. Though, for the timeframe under analysis, the first five 
banks from the Romanian banking sector control more than half of the entire system. 
The number of credit institutions has ranged from a minimum of 36 in 2015 to 43 in 
2008. Thus, after the global financial crisis we can notice the beginning of a 
continuous process of consolidation through either national or international M&As. 
For year 2015, we can notice an increase in concentration for both indices due to a 
drop in the number of financial institutions because of the mergers between 
Transilvania Bank and Volksbank and OTP Bank and Millennium Bank, and the exit 
of  The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, Edinburgh – Romanian branch.  
Turning to the non-structural indicators, we can state that there is a tendency towards 
increasing competition in the Romanian banking sector. Therefore, we can conclude 
that there is a decline in the market power, along with higher profitability ratios 
because of a relocation of market share from the least to the most efficient banks, 
given the fierce competition. 
Regarding the analysis of the competition on loan vs deposit market, we may see 
different sometimes opposite evolutions. As a matter of fact, adjusted Lerner index 
shows that the market power increases, indicating a decrease in competition opposite 
to deposit taking. Year 2008 can be considered a year of the extreme outcomes, given 
the strongest competition on loan market and the least for deposits. Practically, this 
year is the most effervescent after 1989, as it the year before the financial crisis when 
the highest volume of loans has been registered. A lower competition on deposit 
market might be due to important resources that the foreign banks from Romania 
obtained from their mother financial institutions. 
On the other hand, Boone indicator displays similar trends for both markets, the only 
difference occurring in 2015. There has been an increasing competition for the 
deposits over the entire period, while the same situation occurs in the loan markets 
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until 2011, followed by a sustained decline until 2015. This is due to the 
nonperforming loans and the bank focus on reducing their amount via sales and a 
more precautious attitude towards granting new credits. Besides, another cause is 
represented by post-crisis effects, when the number of fundable projects and firms 
has diminished due to worse business environment and creditworthiness of 
companies and individuals. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The Romanian banking sector has been subject of a consolidation and restructuring 
process after the international financial crisis. Overall there is an increase in the 
competition level, due to a decline in market power and concentration.  Though, at 
the end of the period analysed there is an increase in concentration and lower 
competition on loan market. Banking competition has caused several banks to exit 
the marketplace or to merge in order to optimize their activities. Given these facts, 
we recommend to the supervisory authorities to pay more attention to the risks the 
new entities may generate and to the trend towards consolidation that is expected to 
continue several years from now on. As for bankers, we advise them to be cautious 
when it comes to lending and be more flexible towards SMEs financing with a 
stronger potential growth and sustainable businesses on the long-term. In this way, 
there will be set the premises for Romanian economic growth and implicitly, for the 
future development of the banking sector. At the same time, banks should pursue the 
adjusting process through the optimization of their processes, as higher competition 
will resettle the market share to the most efficient credit institutions.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of HHI 
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Figure 2. Evolution of C5 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of adjusted Lerner index 
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Figure 4. Evolution of Boone indicator 
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